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Abstract
We present an experiment involving learned categorical
perception for natural faces, using four different cat-
egory learning tasks. In the four tasks, participants
learned to classify faces divided on the basis of gen-
der, hair color, a subjective determined level of ‘trust’,
or at random. After category learning, participants
rated the similarity of each pair of faces, and their judg-
ments were compared to a previously collected ‘base
rate’ set of similarities for the same stimuli. Evidence for
learned categorical perception was then sought, in the
form of increased differences between intra-category and
inter-category similarities. Over the four conditions, we
observed no learned categorical perception when cate-
gories were based on obvious properties (gender and hair
color), nor when the category structure was intentionally
random. However, when the loosely defined category
structure of trust was employed, a learned categorical
perception effect emerged.
If every stimulus were perceived as a unique event,
we would be rapidly inundated with pointless informa-
tion. So we organize our perceptions into categories,
allowing us to describe the world in a simpler manner,
and to generalize better to novel situations. As a conse-
quence of this restructuring, items belonging to the same
categories tend to be perceived as more similar to one
another, while items belonging to different categories ap-
pear less similar. These categorical perception phenom-
ena have been observed in a range of domains such as
phonemic categories (e.g., Liberman, Harris, Hoffman &
Griffith, 1957), color categories (e.g., Bornstein & Ko-
rda, 1984; Ozgen & Davies, 2002), musical pitch cat-
egories (Burns & Ward, 1978), and facial expressions
(e.g., Bimler & Kirkland, 2001; Etcoff & Magee, 1992).
Categorical perception effects rely on an interaction be-
tween the perceptual representation of the environment
and the conceptual representations used to interpret it,
and so are a central issue in cognitive modeling.
In this paper we consider the acquisition of categorical
perception for naturalistic faces. We present an experi-
ment in which a prior category learning task is shown to
influence subsequent similarity judgements, but only for
some category structures.
Learned Categorical Perception
While categorical perception effects may be partially in-
nate (e.g., Barrera & Maurer, 1981), much of human
conceptual structure is likely to be learned, so there has
been some interest in the notion of learned categorical
perception. Such studies typically measure the effect of
a prior learning task on a subsequent discrimination task.
For instance, Goldstone (1994) demonstrated that prior
learning of categories based on stimulus size or bright-
ness improved performance on subsequent same-different
judgements based on the same dimension. The goal in
studies of this kind is to see how the act of learning the
category structure affects the subsequent judgements,
and specifically to see if the recently learned category
is reflected in these judgements.
Two main theoretical explanations have been pro-
posed to account for learned categorical perception
(Goldstone, Lippa & Shiffrin, 2001). According to the
altered object description account, simply learning that
a set of stimuli share a label is sufficient to change the
way that they are perceived. In its strongest form, the
altered object description account can be viewed as a
variant of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Whorf,
1964), in which linguistic labels are taken to form the
underlying basis of perception itself. In a weaker form,
it asserts that the prior learning experience allows people
to (perhaps temporarily) observe or attend to different
properties of the stimuli, adapting their representations
to suit the context.
The alternative account is the strategic judgement bias
account, which argues that categorical perception effects
can be viewed as a response to task demands, in which
people adopt a new decision strategy, but do not alter
the representational description of stimuli. As with the
altered object account, the strategic judgement bias ac-
count has strong versions and weak versions. A strong
version of this theory states that the judgements are a
deliberate response to the experimental task, and do not
reflect any change in the way stimuli are perceived. For
instance, if participants are told that two stimuli belong
to the same class, then they will assume that they are
supposed to rate them as more similar. Accordingly,
they alter their similarity ratings, but do not alter the
stimulus representation. In a weaker form, it asserts that
prior category learning informs people that some prop-
erties are more likely to be relevant to the task than
others, so people will focus their decision processes on
these properties.
It seems clear that the weak form of the altered object
description account is remarkably similar to the weak
form of the strategic judgement bias account. In both
cases, the role of category learning is to allow people
to attend to different properties of the stimulus enviro-
ment. The only substantial difference is that the altered
object description account treats this shift as a repre-
sentational process, while the strategic judgement bias
account views it as a decision process. Arguably, this is
more a semantic disagreement than anything else. Ac-
cordingly, we refer to this as the attentional reweighting
account.
The most notable feature of attentional reweighting
is that it implies that not all category structures will
produce categorical perception. If learned categorical
perception results from a dimensional attention process
(or feature weighting, in the discrete case) applied to the
stimulus representations, then it will only appear in sit-
uations when the learned category structure allows this
kind of attentional shift to take place. That is, the mech-
anism underlying learned categorical perception is con-
strained to a limited class of representational changes.
Categories with no structure will not induce learned cat-
egorical perception, since no representational learning
would be expected to take place. This is in contrast to
the strong versions of both the altered object and strate-
gic judgement bias accounts, in which the effect should
not depend on the amount of structure inherent in the
category. In what follows, we present an experiment into
the learned categorical perception of faces, in which we
systematically vary the amount of structure in the cate-
gory, and observe a corresponding variation in the extent
of categorical perception.
Categorical Face Perception
The stimulus domain we used was faces. Faces are one
of the most studied stimulus domains in categorical per-
ception, since they are important visual stimuli in hu-
man environments (Ellis & Young, 1989). Moreover,
faces are complex multidimensional stimuli, allowing a
great variety in the kinds of properties that they pos-
sess. Faces can often be successfully classified remark-
ably quickly, even under changes in lighting, viewing
angle, size and expression (Bruce, 1994), though often
with a decrement in accuracy (Laughery & Wogalter,
1989). Furthermore, there is evidence that categorical
perception for faces can be learned. For instance, Beale
and Keil (1995) constructed a set of faces that inter-
polated between photographs of Bill Clinton and John
Kennedy, and found evidence for strong boundary effects
in terms of the resemblances to the two original pho-
tographs, whereas there were no such effects for faces
that interpolated between photographs of two unfamil-
iar people. In a later study, Levin and Beale (2000)
found categorical effects for unfamiliar faces, including
other-race and inverted faces. Further evidence in favor
of learned categorical perception for faces is provided by
Stevenage (1998), who demonstrated that participants
were better able to discriminate between twins after a
category learning task.
In an elegant study designed to compare the altered
object description account to the strategic judgement
bias account, Goldstone et al. (2001) used four faces (A,
B, C and D) that were morphed to produce a total of
16 faces with different degrees of similarity to the orig-
inals. Participants completed a pre-categorization simi-
larity task, a category learning task (in which A and B
formed one category, and C and D formed the other),
followed by another similarity task. As one might ex-
pect, there was a decrease in the similarity ratings for
between-category pairs, but no corresponding increase
in within-category similarities. In order to discriminate
between the altered object description account and the
strategic judgement bias account, they included a neu-
tral face E in the similarity rating tasks. Under a strate-
gic decision view, A, B, C and D should all have the
same relationship to E after the category learning task
as they did beforehand. However, under an altered de-
scription view, the similarity between A and E should
grow more like the similarity between B and E. Since
the latter was observed empirically, they concluded that
some representational change had occurred.
Experiment
The aim in this experiment is to examine the effect of
the category structure itself on learned categorical per-
ception. To that end, we are interested in three qualita-
tively different types of category. First, we want highly
structured categories, to which people are presumably
already attuned. In these cases, the category structure
is likely to have been learned prior to the experiment,
and we would predict that categorical perception effects
would be observed irrespective of whether participants
were “trained” on this category. Secondly, we want thor-
oughly arbitrary categories with no particular structure.
In these cases, we would predict that no categorical per-
ception would exist a priori, nor would any be learned.
Finally, we want category structures with limited struc-
ture, which people would not perceive a priori, but could
learn to do so.
Method
Participants. Forty participants (10 males, 30 females)
aged 18 to 58 years took part in the experiment, re-
cruited through the University of Adelaide.
Materials. The stimuli were the 25 frontal photographs
of faces, originally obtained from the Psychological Im-
age Collection at Stirling (PICS) repository1, for which
pairwise similarity ratings had previously been collected
by O’Doherty and Lee (2002). The faces were presented
in color against a light background and occupying an
area of approximately 5cm×5cm on a computer screen.
These faces are shown in Figure 1.
Procedure. Participants completed a category learn-
ing task followed immediately by a similarity-rating task.
We used four conditions for the category learning task
in a between-subjects design. The similarity judgements
collected by O’Doherty and Lee (2005) for these stimuli
were used as a control condition. In the first experimen-
tal condition, the category to be learned separated the
female faces (A-L) from the male faces (M-Y), intended
to represent a highly structured category. In the second
1http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk/
Figure 1: The 25 photographs used in the experiment,
labeled A to Y.
condition, also intended to be structured, the faces were
distinguished by hair color, with the “lighter” category
consisting of faces C, D, E, G , J, L, N, Q and Y. In
the third condition, the categories were based on a sub-
jective measure of “trustworthiness”, with the intent to
capture a loosely-defined, partially structured category.
Broadly speaking, “trustworthy” faces were based on fea-
tures such as large eyes, large forehead, small chin, softer
face shape, high eyebrows, and smiling expression (see
Berry, 1990; McArthur & Apatow, 1983/34; Zebrowitz
& Montepare, 1992; Berry & McArthur, 1986). Faces
C, D, E, H, K, L, N, O, P, T, U and X were treated
as trustworthy. In the final condition, faces were di-
vided into “random” categories, intended to lack any
noticeable structure. The categories contained an equal
number of males, an equal number of lighter-hair faces
and an equal number of the trustworthy faces. Addi-
tionally, we attempted to ensure that no other obvious
feature distinguished between the two categories. Faces
A, C, E, F, J , K, M, N, P, R, U and V formed one
of the categories. During the category learning task,
stimuli were presented for 8 blocks in which each face
was presented exactly once. On each trial, participants
were asked which category the face belonged to, and re-
ceived feedback after their response. In the subsequent
similarity-rating task, participants rated the similarity
of all (252 ) = 300 pairs of stimuli on a five-point scale.
















































Figure 2: Learning curves for faces across the four con-
ditions. The dotted lines show the learning curves for
every participant in the experiment, while the solid lines
show the averaged curves for each condition.
Results
Category Learning. Figure 2 shows the learning
curves for all participants and all conditions. Each of
the dotted lines represents the learning curve for an in-
dividual participant, while the solid lines represent the
averaged performance for each condition. Not surpris-
ingly, condition 1 was the easiest category structure to
learn, with the average proportion of correct responses
rising from 82% in the first block to 97% in the final
block. As shown in Figure 3, the only face that caused
difficulty in the first 75 trials was face L.
As expected, the second easiest category to learn was
the one based on hair color (condition 2), in which per-
formance rose from 56% correct in the first block to 82%
correct in the final block. When broken down by item,
as in Figure 3, the interesting face is R, for which perfor-
mance was at chance at the beginning of the experiment,
but was almost universally misclassified over the last 75
trials.
For condition 3, the category structure based on
“trust”, the proportion of correct responses rose from
57% in the first block to 74% in the final block. The
comparison of the individual item performance for the
first 75 trials with the last 75 trials shown in Figure 3
shows no obvious structure. Performance seems to have
improved in a reasonably similar way for most items.
In condition 4, performance rose from 50% to 65%, and
















































Figure 3: Proportion correct for each face in each condi-
tion. The solid bars represent performance over the first
75 trials, while the floating bars represent performance
over the last 75 trials.
once again there is no obvious pattern to the partici-
pants’ performance.
Similarity Data. Figure 4 plots the reported similar-
ities between faces in all four conditions. On the right
hand side of each plot are the pairwise similarities be-
tween stimuli that belong to different categories, while
the left hand side shows similarities between stimuli that
belong to the same category. Ratings by participants in
the control condition are shown in white, while those
by participants who had experienced the prior category
learning are shown in black. The line plots shown with
circular markers correspond to the mean similarities, and
the squares plotted on either side show the full distribu-
tion of reported similarities.
The most salient aspect of the plots is the overall de-
crease in similarity from the control condition to the
learning condition. The notable exception, however, is in
the “hair color” condition, where the mean performance
of the two groups is indistinguishable (although their
is more variability in the learning group). The second
salient aspect of Figure 4 are the effects of categorical
structure itself. Conditions 1 and 2 show greater simi-
larity for within-category items in both the control group
and the learning group. Condition 4 shows less similar-
ity for within-category items in both the control group
and the learning group, though there is some evidence
that this effect is slightly stronger in the learning group.
Most importantly, however, in condition 3 there is no
difference in within-category and between-category sim-
ilarities for the control group, while the learning group
rated between-category items substantially less similar
than within-category items.
Discussion
Exposure and Dissimilarity. It is a general result
that increased familiarity with a set of stimuli facilitates
greater discriminability. In a sense, one can imagine a
representational space being stretched, causing all stim-
uli to be a little further apart. Similarly, greater ex-
posure may allow more appropriate features to be ob-
served, fine-tuning the representation. This differenti-
ation between stimuli should be expected to decrease
the overall similarity between all stimuli, when compared
with a group of participants that had not undertaken a
prior category learning task. This decrease in similarity
from the control condition to the learning condition is
the most salient property in Figure 4.
The notable exception, however, is in the “hair color”
condition, where the two groups are indistinguishable.
A possible reason for this would involves the nature of
the feature that distinguishes between the two classes.
If, during learning, people attend only to hair color and
ignore other features, there would be little reason to ex-
pect any substantial differentiation between stimuli (a
kind of “representational irrelevance”). In contrast, gen-
der is not a “primitive” feature, and requires that atten-
tion be paid to a number of aspects of the face. Thus,
even though gender is likely to be highly salient a priori,
other features are still likely to be observed. Similarly,
the “trust” condition and the “random” condition re-
quires that a whole host of facial features and properties
receive attention.
Variation in Learned Categorical Perception. In
the gender and hair color conditions, the within-category
similarity is higher than the between-group similarity for
both the control and the learning groups, and there is no
evidence of any kind of interaction effect. In other words,
besides the effects discussed earlier (which are unlikely
to be a categorical perception effect), the learning ap-
pears to have induced no learned categorical perception.
The reason for this seems to be simple. Gender and hair
color are salient properties that influence the perception
of faces in the real world (and form categories that are
used in real life, e.g., “dark-haired male”), and to the ex-
tent that any categorical perception occurs, participants
were sensitive to it prior to beginning the experiment.























































Figure 4: The distributions of the (normalized) pairwise similarity ratings for the 25 faces. Each of the 16 vertical
plots is a histogram, in which the area of each rectangle is proportional to the probability associated with a particular
similarity. Within each panel, the left side shows similarity distributions for the control group, while the right hand
side shows the distribution of similarities for the learning group. In both cases, the similarity between stimuli that
belonged to the same category (for the learning group) is plotted in black, and the similarity between stimuli that
belonged to different categories is plotted in white. The line plots show the differences between the means. A
potential categorical perception effect is evident in condition 3, in which the learning group rated within-category
similarities higher than the between-category similarities, but the control group did not.
certain properties that were already highly salient hap-
pened to be the appropriate basis for the classification
decisions. Nothing new needed to be noticed, and no
representational changes were required.
The trust and random conditions are rather differ-
ent. In both cases, the control group shows no difference
between the within-category and the between-category
stimuli, suggesting that there is little structure in the
categories that was salient to participants a priori. In
condition 4, the learning group is similar to the control
group, suggesting that no categorical perception was in-
duced by learning. However, in condition 3, there is a
marked difference: the between-category items are as-
sumed to be much less similar than the within-category
items.
General Discussion
When viewed from a rational perspective (e.g., Ander-
son, 1990) it is natural to expect a certain amount of
variation in learned categorical perception. The most en-
during regularity in our world is change. Some aspects of
the environment fluctuate rapidly, such as weather and
lighting conditions. If we entirely reshaped our assump-
tions about the structure of the world every time the
lights were turned off, we would learn very little about
the world. Instead, we “decide” to dilate our pupils, and
behave more cautiously since we have less sensory infor-
mation arriving. We do not assume that the walls dis-
appear just because we cannot see them. On the other
hand, some aspects of change are lasting, and our in-
terpretations of the world shift with them. With the
advent of the internet, the conceptualisations of commu-
nication (via email, for instance) and scholarship (via
online libraries) have undergone substantial shifts, not
easily reversible. In this context, we assume that the na-
ture of the world has permanently changed, and reshape
our world view to suit.
Given this, we suggest that focusing on the distinc-
tion between “representational shift” and “strategic de-
cisions”, though useful, can be somewhat misleading. In-
stead, when one learns a new category label, it is impor-
tant to consider in which contexts the label is likely to be
useful. Possibly, what we perceive as structure in a cate-
gory are those regularities that are expected to be stable
and important, enduring over a range of contexts and
retaining some diagnosticity across them. If a new cate-
gory label reflects a newly observed but possibly endur-
ing regularity in the environment (e.g., finding tumours
in x-rays), we should expect to observe relatively endur-
ing shifts in representation and behavior. However, if the
new label is arbitrary and of no general significance (e.g.,
most category learning experiments), any changes to be-
havior should be highly limited. If so, learned categorical
perception effects are only likely to be observed when the
new category is sufficiently important that people might
reasonably expect it to be relevant in the future.
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